The fiscal theory of the price level and sluggish inflation : how important shall the wealth effect be ?. by Creel, Jérôme & Sterdyniak, Henri
1
The fiscal theory of the price level and sluggish inflation: how important
shall the wealth effect be?
J. Creel and H. Sterdyniak*
Abstract
According to the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL), the interactions between monetary and fiscal
policies with governments facing the possibility to act in a non-Ricardian manner make the general price
level be fully determined. Here, depending on the expectations framework, we show to what extent the
validity of the FTPL also depends on consumers being non-Ricardian. With prices driven by rational
expectations, the qualitative results of the strategic interactions between policies do not depend on the
Ricardian or non-Ricardian behaviour by the households. With sluggish inflation, the strong version of the
FTPL does not bring to a dynamically stable economy. The economy is stable only for a weak version of
the FTPL; but, this time, stability conditions depend strongly on the existence and size of the wealth effect.
If inflation is sluggish, the FTPL is incompatible with Ricardian consumers.
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I. Introduction
The  Fiscal Theory of the Price Level – hereafter FTPL –, has given rise to many
contributions since the beginning of the nineties1. This theory studies the determination of the
price level, in an economy with perfectly flexible prices and with monetary authorities
reacting weakly to inflation deviations from a target level. The FTPL states that the
determination of inflation would no longer be a monetary phenomenon, but a fiscal one linked
to the predetermined level of public debt. The relation to the Quantity Theory is obvious:
public debt is a nominal, predetermined variable, like money supply in the Quantity Theory.
More noteworthy: public debt depends on arbitrary definitions like monetary aggregates:
where do narrow monetary aggregates stop? where do broader ones begin? does public debt
include public firms accounts, or implicit retirement system debt? what is the statute of
indexed debt? 
According to the FTPL, governments can disregard their intertemporal  budget constraint
if monetary policy does not react strongly to inflation. This theory therefore applies to
governments the well-known ‘non-Ricardian’ behaviour that Barro (1974) applied to
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households. The government faces an alternative: it is Ricardian if it plans its future expected
primary surpluses so that they meet the present value budget constraint for any possible
values of the price level and the interest rate; it is non-Ricardian if it lets the realisation of the
macroeconomic equilibrium satisfy ex post its intertemporal equilibrium. 
The determination of the price level faces an alternative also. If prices are perfectly
flexible, the price level  can jump at each period to insure fiscal solvency. The price level thus
depends directly on expected policies. If prices adjust sluggishly, the price level does not
depend directly on expected policies but the latter impinge on the general economic setting
(interest rates, assets prices, production…), so that expected policies finally influence
indirectly the price level.
So far, papers dealing with the FTPL have never given attention to sluggish inflation (or
backward-looking Phillips curve). Although some economists studied the implications of
sluggish prices in the FTPL (Woodford, 1996; Leith and Wren-Lewis, 2000), they did not
consider the case with adaptive expectations. However, the sluggish inflation assumption does
not seem at odds with the literature dealing with the determination of the inflation rate (see
Fuhrer, 1997; or Mankiw, 2001). In this paper, we thus wish to concentrate on the following
question: is there a room for the FTPL in an economy with sluggish inflation?
A debate between Buiter and Woodford is quite emblematic of the degree of validity of
the FTPL. Buiter (2000) notably raises a problem with the so-called “non-Ricardian”
behaviour by the government, namely that an economic constraint (the present value
government constraint) cannot be a condition for reaching the equilibrium. An economic
constraint must be met for all possible sequences of prices, interest rates and production,
whereas an equilibrium condition is, by definition, only met at equilibrium. The answer by
Woodford (2001) promotes the idea – but without presenting any clear-cut demonstration –
that non-Ricardian consumers are a necessary condition for the FTPL to hold: “the basic
economic mechanism (at the heart of the FTPL) is the wealth effect of fiscal disturbances
upon private expenditure. The anticipation of lower primary government surpluses makes
households feel wealthier (…). Equilibrium is restored when prices rise to the point that the
real value of nominal assets (held by households) no longer exceeds the present value of
expected future primary surpluses, since at this point the private and public expenditure that
households can afford is exactly equal in value to what the economy can produce.” (p.684) 
Drawing on this setting, Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000) (LWL hereafter) proposed a
macroeconomic framework for the FTPL. They examined the interactions between monetary3
and fiscal policies in an economy with sticky prices and non-Ricardian consumers (finitely-
lived agents who face a higher discount factor than the government). These deviations from
the neo-classical framework implied a richer set of interactions between policies than the
usual channel of seigniorage revenues or surprise inflation at the core of the FTPL. LWL
demonstrated that two stable policy regimes could be identified: in the first one, monetary
policy would be ‘active’ in the sense defined by Leeper (1991), i.e. reacting toughly to
inflation deviations from their steady-state value; while fiscal policy would be ‘passive’, i.e.
reacting toughly to public debt deviations from their steady-state value. In the second one,
monetary policy’s reactions towards inflation would be weaker whereas the government
would stabilise public debt very slowly. This case was clearly the closest to Woodford’s work
(2001) dealing with the FTPL. At this point, LWL also conclude that Ricardian consumers are
not contradictory with the FTPL. We question the relevance of this conclusion in the paper.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. After presenting the general (neo-classical)
setting of the FTPL (section II) and a variation by Woodford with sticky prices (section III),
we turn to LWL’s model and present it with sluggish inflation (section IV). We then evaluate
the capacity of this model to reproduce the main conclusions of the FTPL.
II. The FTPL: the case with perfectly flexible prices 
Among the various articles which discussed the main features of the FTPL, the paper by
Woodford (1995) is one of the most important. He presents the FTPL as a credible alternative
to the Quantity Theory, in which the nominal value of the public debt must be equal to the
future value of expected fiscal surpluses. Since the difference between money and assets is
disappearing – money used at the macroeconomic level is not fiat money with a zero nominal
return but, rather, an asset yielding a nominal positive return –, Woodford states that a narrow
monetary aggregate can no longer be controlled for by a central bank. He proposes that the
Quantity Theory of money be replaced with a “Quantity Theory of public debt”.
In his article, two steady state equilibria are considered within a neo-classical framework.
The first one introduces a dominant monetary authority; the primary surplus must meet the
present value budget constraint (eq. 1 below) for any values of the nominal income and the
real interest rate. This regime is labelled ‘Ricardian’.
The present value budget constraint of the State can be written as:4
(1) 
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∑ ∏ =+  where bt are the public debt obligations at the end of the
period, in relation to the GDP; st the public primary surplus (in percentage of the GDP) and r*
the real interest rate less the GDP growth rate. 
Under the assumption that r* is constant and that the output has reached its steady state







Now suppose that the government sets the primary surplus according to the following
rule:
(3)  1 () tt s sbb γ
−−
− =− − , where the superscript denotes long term steady state values. 
Eqs. 2 and 3 then determine the long term primary surplus, and the present value budget
constraint cannot determine the general price level. The latter is determined by the monetary
authority, either through the Quantity theory equation: M Py κ = , if the central bank controls
the monetary aggregate M (κ  is the inverse of money velocity); or via an interest rate rule, as
long as the nominal interest rate depends strongly on the inflation rate (demonstration given in
Woodford, 1995). 
The second regime introduces a dominant fiscal authority: the primary surplus does not
react to the variations of public debt, i.e. the government does not implement policies in
accordance with the satisfaction of its intertemporal constraint. This regime is labelled ‘non-
Ricardian’. The general price level must ‘jump’ so that the real debt obligations of the
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, where p is the general price level , and B are the
nominal public debt obligations in percentage of the GDP.
The initial price level depends on the initial stock of nominal public debt. If expectations
concerning the primary surpluses or the real interest rates (less the GDP growth rates) change,
the price level moves upward. One condition must hold (Buiter, 1998): if the real interest rate
is above the GDP growth rate, the long term primary surplus must be strictly positive. 
Two different mechanisms are put forward to justify the adjustment of the general price
level in this second regime. First, the value of the public debt would be determined by the5
expectations of future surpluses; this would make its valuation be similar to the valuation of a
private stock (see Cochrane, 1998). In this case however, the general price level would have
to be as volatile as a stock price, a situation which is not realistic. According to the second
mechanism, the price index would ‘jump’ in accordance with the influence of the real wealth
effect on aggregate demand (Woodford, 1998, 2001 – see the quotation upward). This second
mechanism is also questionable, but only insofar as it supposes that households are non-
Ricardian.
III. The FTPL: sticky prices with forward-looking expectations
The existence of perfectly flexible prices has long been challenged in macroeconomic
theory (see Calvo, 1983, for a prominent contribution). Hence, Woodford (1996) extended the
FTPL to the case with sluggish prices. Presenting his micro-founded model with some
simplifications – expectations are perfect; fiat money is excluded; the interest rate rule does
not depend on the output gap – but without loss of generality, it comes down to four
equations:
(5)  11 () tt tt t yy i σ πθ ++ =−− + ;
(6)  1 tt t y π πα + =+;
(7)  tt i λπ = ;
(8)  1 () tt t tt bb i g π + =+ Ψ− +;
where y is the output (in log), i the nominal interest rate, π  the inflation rate, b the public debt
to GDP ratio, and g the net public transfers in percentage of the GDP. A subscript denotes
time.
Eq. 5 is a usual rational-expectations demand curve including a negative impact of the
real interest rate (σ  is a positive parameter) and θ is a demand i.i.d. shock. Households are
Ricardian so that public transfers do not affect consumption. Eq. 6 is an expectations-
augmented Phillips curve which proceeds from the assumed existence of staggered nominal
price setting by monopolistically competitive firms (see Calvo, 1983). With parameter α
positive, expectations are rational and we obtain a forward-looking Phillips curve. Eq. 7 is the
interest rate rule followed by the central bank, with λ a positive parameter. Eq. 8 results from
the linearisation of debt dynamics, where Ψ  is the value of public debt at the steady state.
Eqs. 5 to 7 give the inflation rate dynamics:6
(9)  21 (2 ) (1 ) ttt π ασ π ασλ π ++ =+ − + . 




t π γπ =  with  1 γ < . 
This solution is feasible if and only if  1 λ < , which means that the central bank has to
under-react to an inflation deviation from its initial steady state, i.e. the real interest rate has to
decrease if inflation increases. 
Woodford then introduces two other assumptions. First, he considers that the public
deficit is raised according to the following process: 
(11)  0
t
t g g ρ = , with 01 ρ << . 
Second, he assumes that the public debt to GDP ratio returns in the long run to its initial
level. Both assumptions enable to determine the initial general price level, using also eqs. 7, 8,
and 10: 
(12)  00 (1 ) /[ (1 )(1 )] pg γ ψλ ρ =− −− .
According to eq. 12, an expected announcement of increasing public deficits provokes
immediately a steep rise in the general price level, then a progressive reduction in the inflation
rate. The inflationary process makes the State be solvent. With the reduction in the inflation
rate, output is higher than at the initial steady state (eq. 6) but progressively tends towards it
(eq. 5). Since the central bank does not react toughly to inflation deviations from the steady
state, the resulting decrease in the real interest rate reduces the value of public debt. The
higher the response of the central bank towards inflation, the more inflationary the shock. The
model becomes unstable if  1 λ > . Woodford (1996) concludes that his model generates
fiscally-induced inflation without seignoriage, nor change in the implementation of monetary
policy in the face of growing public debt. 
Two major assumptions in Woodford’s paper are questionable. First, Woodford assumes
that monetary policy is passive ( 1 λ < ), although most empirical results show the opposite
since the eighties (see for instance Clarida and alii, 1998, 2000). Second, sluggish prices do
not mean that the inflation rate itself is sluggish2: eq. 6 states that the inflation rate is not a
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pre-determined variable. One should question the relevance of this assumption. Fuhrer (1997),
for instance, showed on US data that the inclusion of future inflation rates in the determinants
of the actual inflation rate was not statistically significant. Mankiw (2001) shows that
equation 6 “is completely at odds with the facts” (p. C52) and that a traditional backward-
looking Phillips curve is “mysteriously” more accurate3. In the following, we will thus rewrite
eq. 6 with inflation lags.
IV. The model by Leith and Wren-Lewis, with some new results
Contrary to Woodford (1996), LWL (2000) introduce finitely-lived agents. They use the
perpetual youth model of Blanchard (1985), which shows under precise microfoundations that
public debt can be considered as net wealth by consumers (they can be labelled ‘non-
Ricardian’).
LWL introduce two feedback rules, one monetary, the other fiscal, and determine the
stability conditions of the resulting macroeconomic model. As in Leeper (1991), two locally-
stable regimes are found. In each regime, one policy must be passive whereas the other one
must be active. Monetary policy is passive if the nominal interest rate under-reacts to
inflation; fiscal policy is passive if taxes (or public spending) react substantially to public debt
variations. Policies are active in the reverse case, respectively.
In the following, we present a simplified version of LWL’s model: we drop the
intertemporal framework and go straight to the macroeconomic equations; we also drop
human capital and disregard money as an asset (this case is studied by the authors
themselves). Like LWL, we do not introduce physical capital but one sort of financial assets:
Treasury bills with variable coupons. The full model is embodied in the five following
equations:
(13)  1 tt tt yck b r τ σ − =− + −  
(14)  1 t tt ay ππ − =+
                                                                                                                                                 
– is a jump variable that can change immediately to changing conditions. Similarly, in models of staggered price adjustment,
the price level adjusts slowly, but the inflation rate can jump quickly. Unfortunately for the model, that is not what we see in
the data.” (pp. C53-54)
3 Gali and alii (2001) claim that they provide evidence that a forward-looking Phillips curve “fits very well Euro data”
but, in their study, the anticipated inflation depends only on past variables. In their inflation equation, they put as the only
explanatory variable the real unit labour cost, which is not exogenous relatively to the inflation process, so that their equation
is only a badly-specified reduced form of a traditional Phillips curve. Note that Benigno and Lopez-Salido (2001), hinging on
the methodology developed by Gali and alii (2001), show that only Germany out of five European countries support the
forward-looking Phillips curve. In the other four countries (France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands), they find a substantial
inertial behaviour in inflation.8
(15)  1 (1 ) tt t t br b τ − =+ −
(16)  1 tt fb τ − =
(17)  tt r µπ =
Eq. 13 make aggregate demand (y, expressed in log) depend negatively on net lump-sum
taxes (τ) and the real interest rate (r), and positively on public debt (k and c are nil if
consumers are Ricardian). Public spending is supposed to be fixed and equal to zero. 
Eq. 14 is a discrete-time Phillips curve. If parameter a is negative, eq. 14 is a forward-
looking Phillips curve, equivalent to eq. 6. With parameter a positive, we obtain a traditional
backward-looking Phillips curve with sluggish inflation. 
Eq. 15 illustrates the government’s dynamic budget constraint, in real terms. 
Eq. 16 describes the behaviour of the government which sets its taxes in accordance with
the stabilisation of public debt. 
Eq. 17 represents the behaviour of the central bank which fixes the real interest rate to
stabilise the inflation rate. Parameters f and µ indicate the ‘strength’ of fiscal and monetary
policies, respectively. Monetary policy is passive if  0 µ < , active otherwise. 
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,
where dx is the time derivative for variable x,  x ∂  denotes deviation from steady state for
variable x, and a zero subscript for variable x represents its value at the initial steady state.
The determinant and the trace for matrix A are respectively:  [ ] 00 0 () Det A a f cb r kb µσ σ =+ − −
and  0 Tr A r f aσµ =−− .
Contrary to what Leith and Wren-Lewis mentioned in their article4, the necessary
conditions for stability are not the same whether inflation is backward or forward-looking.
Drawing on this false assumption, Leith and Wren-Lewis do not study the implications of
sluggish inflation in their model. With adaptive expectations (a>0), there are two pre-
determined variables (wealth and inflation); but there is only one (wealth) with rational
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expectations (a<0). In the first case, the model is stable if detA 0 and trA 0 >< ; in the second
one, det 0 A<  is a sufficient condition. 
With rational expectations (a0 < ), the solution has a saddle-path structure. Two locally-
stable regimes exist. First, an active monetary policy ( 0 µ > ) can be implemented as long as
fiscal policy is passive (see table 1) and stabilises public debt. Second, if fiscal policy is active
(f0 = ), monetary policy must be passive ( 0 µ < ) to stabilise debt. These regimes are exactly
those found by Leeper (1991) within a neoclassical framework. The case with an active fiscal
policy and a passive monetary policy is consistent with the FTPL. Stability conditions are
very slightly dependent on the value of k (see table 1); and the FTPL can hold even if
consumers are Ricardian ( 0 ck ==).
Table 1: Stability conditions
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Now, suppose that inflation is sluggish (a0 > ). The model is naturally stable if  0 µ> and
f is enough high. Combining an active monetary policy with a passive fiscal one ensures the
stability of the model. 
But a more fundamental question within this expectations regime is: can we still find a
situation which illustrates the FTPL? The answer is no in the case in which fiscal policy does
not respond to public debt growth. Indeed, if  0 f =  is coupled with  0 µ < , the model is locally
unstable since the trace of matrix A is always positive. The strict version of the FTPL is
impossible in this framework. 
Nonetheless, if one studies a smooth version of this theory (f0 >  is coupled with  0 µ < ),
possible values for f which induce a stable economy require that: 
(19) 
2
00 kc r a c a / b σµ σ µ >− − .10
This condition states that the net wealth effect must be strictly positive (remember that
µ<0), otherwise the model with adaptive expectations is unstable. The existence of Ricardian
consumers in this framework is thus a sufficient condition to reject the FTPL, contrary to the
result of LWL.
The importance of parameter k in the stability of the model with adaptive expectations is
best understood in comparison with the rational expectations framework with a passive
central bank ( 0 µ < ). Within the latter model, after a negative public expenditure shock, the
inflation rate immediately decreases, and then progressively returns to its initial steady state
value. During this period, the real interest rate is higher and public debt is below its initial
level. Introducing a net wealth effect ( 0 k > ) has only a marginal impact. With adaptive
expectations, the shock-induced progressive decrease in the inflation rate provokes a
progressive rise in the real interest rate; then, a persistent (or permanent) fall in the output,
unless households have a wealth behaviour. With  0 k > , the rise in the real interest rate
increases public debt and consumption, so that output recovers if the real wealth effect is
tough enough (condition (19)). This process thus necessitates that the fiscal authorities do not
limit too much the variations in the public debt to GDP ratio (f is not high).
If monetary policy is passive and prices expectations are adaptive, the minimum value for
k obviously increases with the gap between the interest rate and the GDP growth rate and with
the under-reaction of the central bank; and it decreases with the level of public debt. 
In table 2, we used different values for parameters to assess the minimum value of
parameter k given by eq. (19) and the possible range of values for the parameter f. Except for
parameters a and σ , values were taken from Leith and Wren-Lewis. 
First, for plausible values of the parameters (baseline case – the data period is annual),
results show that the minimum value for the net wealth effect is equal to 23.2%. This is quite
substantial, if one considers that empirical evidence on this net wealth effect generally gives
small values (see Ludvigson and Steindel, 1999)5. Second, stable values for  f  are rare.
Finally, in order to obtain empirically consistent values of k , we must suppose that monetary
policy, though still under-reacting to inflation, reacts with more stringency towards this target:
for instance, for  0.1 µ =−  (rather than  0.5 µ = − ), k must be superior to 5.8%, and the
necessary degree of stabilisation of public debt must be very small (between 5.5 et 6.5%),11
otherwise the economy faces unstable dynamics. To obtain small minimum values for k, in a
context of a very passive monetary policy, one can also use unrealistic small values for
parameter a (Leith and Wren-Lewis, 2000), or for parameter σ  (van Aarle and alii, 2001).
Using the parameter set used for instance in Hughes Hallett and Vines (1993), the FTPL
would lose any relevance with sluggish inflation.
Table 2: Alternative degrees of fiscal feedback




a 0.5 - 0.1 0.4 0.5
σ 0.5 - 0.65 0.2 1.25
µ -0.5 -0.1 -0.5/-0.1 -0.5 -0.5
k min 0.232 0.058 0.084/0.029 0.055 1.138
f min 0.155 0.055 0.063/0.037 0.07 0.343





N.B.:  00 0.404; 0.5; 0.03. bc r == =
(1): computed with  0.25 k =
(2): computed with  0.075 k =
The effects of a shock on public expenditures may usefully be illustrated by numerical
simulations. Results are reported in the appendix. Public expenditures are increased by 0.5
point of GDP in the first year, and then linearly dies away6. Parameters are taken from the
variant values in table 2. Parameter k is set at 0.075 and the response of taxes to public debt is
supposed to be equal to its maximum possible value: 0.064. One can observe that the increase
in public expenditures stimulates aggregate demand, temporarily increasing both inflation and
output. The decrease in the real interest rate, due to a passive monetary policy, is rather
inflationary. But it also reduces net interests paid on government debt, so that public debt is
reduced and inflation goes back to its initial steady state level. 
                                                                                                                                                 
5 The estimated marginal propensity to consume out of wealth varies from 3.8% to 5%, depending on the methodology. 
6 Public expenditures follow an exogenous, stationary first order autoregressive process:  1 0.5 tt g g − = .12
The situation is quite different if we use LWL’s parameter set (µ  is set at –0.1).
Although the effect of the shock on the output is more temporary, inflation persists longer
than with baseline values. This is consistent with the low level of parameter a in the Phillips
curve. The upper bound for f being lower than in the baseline (see table 2), the initial growth
in public debt also dies away more slowly than in the variant case. The return path towards
the new steady state values for the real interest rate and the tax rate is rather long, in
comparison with the variant case.
V. Conclusion
The FTPL has now become a prominent theory of the determination of the price level. At
its core, one finds the interactions of monetary and fiscal policies, and governments facing the
possibility to act in a non-Ricardian manner, generally in a rational expectations framework.
In the present paper, we have questioned the relevance of the FTPL in an adaptive
expectations framework. More specifically, we have endeavoured to demonstrate to what
extent the validity of the FTPL also depends on consumers being non-Ricardian. 
Four main points have emerged. First, with prices driven by rational expectations, the
qualitative results of the strategic interactions between monetary and fiscal policymakers do
not depend on the Ricardian or non-Ricardian behaviour by the households: that k be nil or
strictly positive modifies only marginally the stability conditions of the model used in section
IV. Second, with sluggish inflation, the strong version of the FTPL does not bring to a
dynamically stable economy. Unless governments react somewhat to the change in the public
debt to GDP ratio, the FTPL is not valid. Third, a government reacting to public debt changes
is not a sufficient condition for a weak version of the FTPL to hold. In this situation, stability
conditions depend crucially on the existence and size of the wealth effect. If this wealth effect
is too low (or too high) and monetary policy is passive, there is no existing degree of reaction
of the government to debt variations which is sufficient to preserve the economy from
unstable dynamics. Fourth, in the case of sluggish inflation, the FTPL is incompatible with
Ricardian consumers. Hence, the compatibility of the FTPL with sluggish inflation appears
very problematic.13
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